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Abstract
The paper investigates two issues regarding household expenditure on primary
education of own children using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey
(IHS2) data. Firstly, we look at factors which inuence a households decision
to spend or not (the participation decision), and by how much (the expenditure
decision). This is done for urban and rural households. We nd that there are
di¤erences in the factors which inuence both decision levels for the two groups of
households. Secondly, to get a deeper understanding of these rural-urban spend-
ing di¤erences, the study develops the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique
for the independent Double Hurdle model. The proposed decomposition is done
at the aggregate and disaggregated levels. The aggregated decomposition allows
us to isolate the expenditure di¤erences into a part attributable to di¤erences in
characteristics and a part which is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. The detailed
(disaggregated) decomposition enables us to pinpoint the major factors behind the
spending gap. At the aggregate decomposition level, our results show that at least
66% of the expenditure di¤erential is explained by di¤erences in characteristics
between rural and urban households, implying that an equalization of household
characteristics would lead to about 66% of the spending gap disappearing. At the
disaggregated decomposition level, the rural-urban di¤erence in household income
is found to be the largest contributor to the spending gap, followed by quality of
access of primary schools. Besides, rural-urban di¤erences in mothers education
and employment are found to contribute more to the spending di¤erential relative
to the same for fathers.
1 Introduction
One of the costs of raising children that must be incurred by parents is investing in their
education. There are two major players in investments in human capital of children
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namely; the household and the government. Household and government expenditure on
education is both an end in itself and a means for achieving other goals of development,
such as economic growth, poverty reduction, improved health status, greater equity and
reduced fertility (Glewwe and Ilias 1996). The low level of human capital development
in most African countries is considered an obstacle for economic growth as well as the
alleviation of poverty (Glick and Sahn 2000).
The Malawi government in recognition of the crucial role that human capital accumula-
tion and development plays in fostering economic growth among other benets introduced
free primary education (FPE) in 1994. Under FPE, parents no longer pay tuition fees,
however they still have to pay for other educational expenses including books, uniforms,
transport, contribution for school building and maintenance among other expenses. This
means that households still have to play a role in investing in the primary education of
their children. Besides, they also have to pay for the education of their children when
they go to secondary school.
In this study, we focus on investment in education by families and not government.
Economists have long been concerned with modelling decisions that parents make re-
garding investments in the education of their children (see Haveman and Wolfe 1995 for
a review). They have investigated the time parents allocate to their children (e.g. Lazear
and Michael 1988; Leibowitz 1974, 1977; van der Gaag 1982). They have focused on
the factors which inuence enrolment in primary and secondary schools (e.g. Kabubo-
Mariara and Mwabu 2007; Glewwe and Ilias 1996). Others have looked at household
willingness to pay for the education of children (e.g. Gertler and Glewwe 1989). Other
studies have looked at the factors which inuence direct education expenditures that
parents make on their children. Here, there are two strands of literature; those that use
aggregated expenditure where expenditure on education is combined with other items
(e.g. Lazear and Michael 1988), and another strand which uses education expenditure as
a stand alone item (e.g. Mauldin et al. 2001; Yueh 2006; Beneito et al. 2001; Song et al.
2006; Kingdon 2005). In this study, we look at education expenditure as a stand alone
item.
While focussing on household expenditure on primary education as a separate item, the
study advances the understanding of the direct expenditures that parents make on their
children in two ways. First, we make a distinction between households by whether they
reside in rural or urban areas1. Most studies looking at spending on education of children
either pool the rural and urban samples or just look at one sample (e.g. Mauldin et al.
(2001) focus on a pooled sample while Yueh (2006), Song et al. (2006), and Kingdon
(2005) look at rural households only). The rural-urban distinction is important as it is
shown in Section 4 that there are di¤erences in average expenditure between households
1Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) make the rural-urban distinction with respect to school enrolment.
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in rural and urban areas. Further to that, Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) contend that the
perceived expected rate of return to education may not be the same between rural and
urban areas, due to di¤erences in returns between the formal sector (mostly urban) and
the agricultural sector (mostly rural). And the implication of this is that a households
expected return to investing in education may be di¤erent between the two areas, and
hence the spending would also reect this. The characteristics between the two areas can
be dissimilar in the sense that for example access to schools in terms of distance would
be poorer in rural areas, reecting an urban bias in terms of developmental projects. A
more detailed discussion of the reasons why we would expect rural-urban di¤erences in
investment in education are given in the theoretical section. With this distinction in mind,
the study looks at factors which inuence a familys decision to spend on own childrens
primary education in rural and urban Malawi. Specically, here we seek to answer two
interrelated questions; a) what factors inuence the probability that a household spends
or does not spend on own childrens education? This is the participation decision. and
b) what factors a¤ect educational expenditure if a household decides to spend? This is
the expenditure decision.
Second, in the light of these rural-urban di¤erences in expenditure, we go a step further
to explain these di¤erences. To this end, we propose an extension of the decomposition
technique developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) to the independent double hur-
dle model2. We then use the proposed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent
double hurdle model to conduct a decomposition of the gap in household expenditure on
education between the two areas. The decomposition isolates how much of the di¤er-
ential in expenditure can be attributed to characteristics (characteristic e¤ect) and how
much is due to di¤erences in returns to those characteristics (coe¢ cient e¤ect), which
we interpret as the di¤erence due to behavioural di¤erences. The two e¤ects give us an
aggregated picture of the reasons for the expenditure gap, and to move on from this black
box explanation of the expenditure gap, we further propose a disaggregated decomposi-
tion of the characteristic e¤ect of the independent double hurdle model3. This detailed
decomposition enables us to pinpoint the major factors behind the spending gap. For
example, a detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect provides an understanding
of the role of household income in the rural-urban spending di¤erential. From a policy
standpoint, while it is important to know whether these expenditure di¤erences arise due
to di¤erences in characteristics of the households or whether they are attributable to be-
havioural di¤erences, it is even more critical that we have knowledge of which individual
characteristics are vital in driving the spending gap.
2Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) conduct a decomposition of school enrolment gaps between rural and
urban areas in Tanzania.
3Owing to interpretational problems of the coe¢ cient e¤ect, we do not undertake a disaggregated
decomposition of the same in this paper.
3
Our empirical results for the two areas of residence show that di¤erent factors inuence
household expenditure on primary education di¤erently. The level of household income
in rural and urban areas positively and signicantly impacts both the participation and
expenditure decisions. Computed elasticities indicate that spending on education by
rural households is more sensitive to changes in income compared to urban households,
suggesting that spending on education in rural areas is a luxury good. We nd that
a fathers and mothers employment status has a bigger impact on spending (at both
decision levels) in rural areas compared to urban areas. For both areas, a mothers
employment and education has a larger impact on spending compared to a fathers.
Urban households compared to their rural counterparts are more sensitive to the quality
of access of primary schools as measured by the distance to nearest primary school. We
nd no evidence of gender bias in school spending in urban areas, but rural households
exhibit bias in favour of boys.
Results from the proposed aggregated decomposition indicate that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential is as a result of di¤erences in characteristics and about 34%
arises from behavioural di¤erences (coe¢ cient e¤ect) between rural and urban house-
holds. This suggests that an equalization of household characteristics (behavior) would
lead to about 66% (34%) of the spending gap disappearing. Results from the disaggre-
gated decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect indicate that household income, parental
education and employment, and quality of access of primary schools are the key factors
driving the spending gap. The rural-urban di¤erence in household income is found to
be the largest contributor to the spending gap, followed by quality of access of primary
schools. Besides, rural-urban di¤erences in mothers education and employment are found
to contribute more to the spending di¤erential relative to the same for fathers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at the education sector in
Malawi. Section 3 presents the theoretical underpinnings on which the study is based
as well possible explanations regarding the gaps in spending between rural and urban
households. In Section 4 we discuss the model specication, variables used, estimation
issues, and data and descriptives. Econometric results are the focus of Section 5. The
extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique and results are discussed in
Section 6. We nally conclude in Section 7.
2 Education in Malawi
The formal education system in Malawi is composed of three levels namely; primary,
secondary, and post secondary. Education at all three levels is not compulsory. The
o¢ cial entry age at the primary school level is about six years. Primary school is made
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of standards one to eight; which is divided into infant (standards 1-2), junior (standards
3-5), and senior (standards 6-8). Since 1994, the government introduced free primary
education (FPE), which entailed that parents no longer had to pay fees for the primary
education of children who attend government schools. Private primary schools however
continue to charge fees. At the end of the eight years of primary education, pupils sit
for the primary school leaving certicate examination (PSLCE). This is a national exam
which determines eligibility of entry into secondary school. Secondary school education
takes four years; the Junior Certicate level (Forms 1 and 2), and the Malawi School
Certicate level (Forms 3 and 4). Parents pay for the secondary education of their
children. So the primary-secondary education cycle takes twelve years4. The length
of post secondary education depends on the type of education programme. University
education takes about three years for a diploma, four to ve years for a degree. In the
recent past, Malawi has experienced a mushrooming of private providers of education at
all three levels of education.
In 2005, four out of ve pupils attending primary education were in government schools.
The next highest providers of primary education were religious institutions. Almost sev-
enteen percent of pupils attending primary school were in religious institutions (National
Statistical O¢ ce 2005). Although government is the dominant provider of secondary
education, the rate is slightly lower compared to that of primary education. In 2005,
government was providing secondary education to 65 percent of all the pupils attending
secondary education relative to 80 percent in primary education. The situation is di¤er-
ent for private schools. More secondary school pupils attended private schools relative to
those in primary education. Nearly one in every three pupils attending secondary educa-
tion were at private institutions. In terms of area of residence in 2005, 81% of primary
school pupils in urban and rural areas attended government schools. This suggests that
the majority of primary school pupils in the two areas are in government schools. There
is however a marked di¤erence in attendance at secondary level, with 42% and 76% of
pupils attending government secondary schools in urban and rural areas respectively. It
has also been noted that the substitution by households for private providers is high-
est for those in the upper expenditure quantiles (National Statistical O¢ ce 2005). At
the university level, government remains a major provider, until 1998 the University of
Malawi was the only university.
4This could however be longer with repetition.
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3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Human capital theory
The theoretical framework on which this study is based is the human capital theory
(Becker 1981; Becker and Tomes 1976). Under human capital theory, consideration is
made of the fact that these investments are generally not made by the primary bene-
ciaries but by their care givers. Thus, there are issues not only of the e¢ ciency of the
investment, but also of the intrahousehold allocation of the expected benets (Alderman
and King 1998). Parentsdecision to educate children is done both for its own sake as
a consumption good, and as an investment good. The theory suggests that parents will
invest time which is a direct input, money which is an indirect input, and other resources
in their childrens education because they get utility from doing that, and it is also an
investment which will give them returns in future. Parents will invest in the education of
their children up to a point where the marginal benet and the marginal cost of investing
are equal (Becker 1981; Becker and Tomes 1976). The theory also postulates that the
human capital of a child also depends on the genetic endowments which are passed on
to children from parents. Becker and Tomes (1986) argue that these endowments from
parents to children regress to the mean. They thus argue; "children with well endowed
parents tend also to have above average endowments but smaller relative to the mean
than their parents, whereas children with poorly endowed parents tend also to have be-
low average endowments but larger relative to the mean than their parents"( Becker and
Tomes 1986, p 5). Thus human capital theory suggests that investments in childrens
human capital are related to parental characteristics, characteristics of the children, and
parental preferences (Becker and Tomes 1986; Hanushek 1992). Expenditures on chil-
drens education, skills, health, and abilities are an indirect input into their childrens
human capital (Becker and Tomes 1986). It is also worth noting that if schooling is a pure
investment good i.e. without current consumption aspects, and there are no credit con-
straints, then income would not a¤ect schooling decisions. However, in many developing
countries credit constraints are prevalent (Behrman and Knowles 1999).
Within the human capital theory framework, others explain gender discrimination re-
garding parental investment in the education of their children (Behrman et al. 1986;
Alderman and Gertler 1997; Alderman and King 1998; Pasqua 2005; Yeuh 2006). This
part of human capital theory deals with why parents may invest more in the education of
their boys than girls or vice versa. This strand of literature identies four possible sources
from which gender di¤erences in education may originate. Firstly, a girl will receive less
schooling if the cost (direct and indirect) of educating her is higher than that of a boy.
This is possible when one considers that the opportunity cost of a girl going to school
6
might be higher as she is more likely to help in caring for younger siblings or fetching
rewood and water (Pasqua 2005; Gertler and Glewwe 1992). Secondly, there will be
less schooling investment in a girl relative to a boy if the returns to education for a girl
are lower. The returns to schooling for a girl can be lower as a result of gender bias in
the labour market. Kingdon (1998) for example, nds signicant gender di¤erences in
returns to education in India. Thirdly, there will be schooling bias against a girl if the
expectation/belief of how much the boy child will transfer in old age is higher than that
of the girl child. This is quite possible under a patrilineal system where a woman has to
leave her family when she gets married and become a member of her husbands family.
Finally, the girl child will have less schooling if parents have preference bias against the
education of a girl in favour of a boy. That is, there will be gender schooling bias against
girls, if parents get more utility from a boys education even when the education level
is the same as that for a boy. We utilize this theoretical framework while focussing on
the rural-urban di¤erences in household school investment on primary school children.
In the next subsection, we present possible explanations for di¤erentials in investment in
education between rural and urban households.
3.2 Explaining di¤erences in school investment between urban
and rural households
Broadly, the reasons for why there may be di¤erences in investment in schooling between
rural and urban households can be put into two categories5. The rst category relates
to explanations which attribute the di¤erence to di¤erences in characteristics between
rural and urban households. The second category comprises explanations which ascribe
the di¤erence to di¤erences in returns to the characteristics. That is, the characteristics
between rural and urban households may be the same, but the returns to (or e¤ectiveness
of ) those characteristics may be di¤erent.
We start with the rst broad category. Di¤erences in characteristics of urban and rural
households may explain the gaps in school investment between the two areas. There
may be di¤erences in characteristics with respect to school quality such as distance to
schools, pupil teacher ratio where these statistics are generally bad for rural areas. In most
developing countries there is an urban bias in terms of general infrastructure including
school facilities. This is well expressed by Lipton (1977) when he observes;
"The most important class conict in the poor countries of the world to-
day is not between labor and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national
interests. It is between rural classes and urban classes....Scarce investment,
5See Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) for a similar categorization.
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instead of going into water-pumps to grow rice is wasted on urban motorways.
Scarce human skills administer, not clean village wells and agricultural exten-
sion services, but world boxing championships in showpiece stadia"( Lipton
1977, p1)
There are several reasons for why rural areas may not be favoured in terms of facilities6. It
could be due to the fact that the provision of urban public goods is cheaper (Arnott and
Gersovitz 1986). It could also arise from the inuence and lobbying power of the urban
elite (Lipton 1977). The disparity could also be due to the fact that urban households
have an information advantage. Majumdar et al.(2004) contends;
"Urban residents have an information advantage that may arise due to
several factors: greater average wealth, higher education, better access to the
media as well as a stronger urban focus in media coverage. Even if both rural
and urban residents observe public good outcomes equally well, this informa-
tion advantage implies that urban residents are better positioned to evaluate
the role of the governments ability in achieving a given outcome" (Majumdar
et al. 2004, p 139).
To the extent that access, availability, and quality of school facilities inuence parental
investment in education of children7, this urban bias may explain the di¤erences in
schooling between the two areas. The urban bias in terms of access and availability of
other facilities such clinics, water facilities may also explain the rural-urban di¤erences
in householdsinvestment in schooling. For example, children are generally involved in
fetching water, and if water facilities are very far (as is the case in rural areas) this may
a¤ect childrens schooling as they dedicate more time to fetching water. Kabubo-Mariara
and Mwabu (2007) nd a negative relationship between time taken to fetch water and
the likelihood of primary school enrolment in Kenya. In addition to the community/area
level disparities in favour of urban areas, we can also have characteristic di¤erences at
the household level between rural and urban areas. Rural households tend to have larger
families than urban households, and assuming a quantity-quality trade-o¤, this should
entail lower schooling in rural areas. Parental education is di¤erent between the two
areas, rural parents are generally less educated than their urban counterparts. And this
may have implications on schooling, for instance the cost of helping with homework may
be less for more-schooled parents than for less-schooled parents (Behrman and Knowles
1999).
6Majumdar et al.(2004) document some evidence of urban bias in public goods provision in developing
countries.
7Studies by Case and Deaton (1999), Lavy (1996), and Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000), nd school
quality to be positively related with school enrolment.
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We now turn to the di¤erences in returns to characteristics story. Al-Samarrai and Reilly
(2000) argue that the perceived expected rate of return to education may be di¤erent
between rural and urban areas due to di¤erences in return between the formal sector
(mostly urban) and the agricultural sector (mostly rural). The implication of this is that
a households expected return to investing in education may be di¤erent between the two
areas, and this would be reected in di¤erentials in school investment between urban and
rural households. To the extent that there may be cultural di¤erences between rural areas
(which tend to be traditional) and urban areas (which tend to be modern) this would be
reected in parental preferences for education. The opportunity cost of schooling between
the two areas may also be di¤erent, in rural areas children are more likely to work in the
eld or indeed be sent o¤ to work as child labourers to supplement family income. And
thus, in rural areas the opportunity cost of sending a child to school is higher relative to the
urban areas. We later propose a decomposition technique which enables us to calculate
which of these broad categories is the predominant explanation for the rural-urban school
spending di¤erential in Malawi. In addition, we develop a disaggregated decomposition
technique which helps us to look at each individual characteristics contribution to the
rural-urban education spending disparity. Before talking about the decomposition, we
rst present in the next section, the econometric model on which the decomposition is
based.
4 Methodology
4.1 Model specication
As discussed earlier, the study is based on direct expenditures that households make on
the primary education of their children. One underlying feature of expenditure data is
that it contains excess zeros, and the choice of a statistical technique used to deal with
the zeros is important, as an inappropriate treatment of zeros can lead to biased and
inconsistent estimates (Greene 1981). The Tobit model (Tobin 1958) has been widely
used to model outcomes which have excess zeros. The Tobit model is derived from
an individual optimization problem and views zeros as corner solution outcomes. The
major drawback of the Tobit model is that it assumes that the same stochastic process
determines both the extensive and intensive margins, that is the decision whether or not
to spend (participation decision) and how much (expenditure decision), are treated as the
same. This assumption is restrictive. A model which corrects this limitation of the Tobit
model is the Double Hurdle model (DH hereafter)8. The DH model, originally formulated
8The DH has been used in various areas in the literature and without purporting to be exhaustive
it has been used to model; expenditure on alcohol (Yen and Jensen 1996), expenditure on cigarettes
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by Cragg (1971), assumes that households make two decisions with regard to spending,
each of which is determined by a di¤erent underlying stochastic process (Blundell and
Meghir 1987). Following Jones (1989), the DH is formally specied as follows;
The participation equation (the rst hurdle) is given as;
Di = Z
0
i+ "i (1)
Di =

1 if Di > 0
0 otherwise
The expenditure equation (the second hurdle) is given as follows;
Y i = X
0
i + i (2)
Y i = max(0; Y

i )
Observed expenditure(Yi);
Yi = DiY

i (3)
where; Di is a latent variable describing the households decision to participate ( spend
or not) on childrens education, Y i is a latent variable describing household expenditure
on childrens education, Z 0i is a vector of variables explaining the participation decision,
X 0i is a vector of variables explaining the expenditure decision. "i; i are independent
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random errors with the following properties; "i  N(0; 1) and i  N(0; 2), and i
denotes household. The parameter vectors are ;  assumed to be linear.
For a positive level of expenditure on education to be observed, two hurdles (hence the
name double hurdle) have to be overcome; rstly, the household must be a potential
spender (i.e. Di = 1) and secondly, it must actually spend on education (i.e. Y i = Y

i ).
In the DH model, observed zeros in expenditure on education may arise either from
participation or consumption decisions and potential spenders may have zero expenditure
on education10.
Using 0 to represent zero expenditure and + to denote positive expenditure, the sample
(Yen 2005; Jones 1989 ), time use (Daunfeldt and Hellström 2007), expenditure on food away from
home (Jensen and Yen 1996; Newman et al 2003), expenditure on cheese (Yen and Jones 1997), and
expenditure on education (Mauldin et al. 2001).
9The assumption of independence is quite common when using the DH (Mauldin et al. 2001; Jensen
and Yen 1996; Su and Yen 1996). Further, Smith (2003) shows that there is little statistical information
to support the estimation of a DH with dependent errors even when dependence exists.
10This is unlike the Heckman model (Heckman 1979), where zeros in expenditure would arise only
through participation.
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likelihood equation for the independent double hurdle model can be written as follows;
L =
Y
0

1   (Z 0i)

1  

X 0i

Y
1
 (Z 0i)
1



Yi  X 0i


(4)
Where (:)and (:)denote the standard normal cumulative density function (CDF), and
the standard normal probability density function (PDF) respectively. The likelihood
function above (equation 4), reduces to that of a Tobit when  (Z 0i) = 1. A closer look
at the likelihood function (equation 4) reveals that it is simply a product of the likelihood
functions of a probit model and a truncated regression model where truncation is at zero.
In other words, the log likelihood of the independent DH is the sum of log likelihood
functions of a probit model and a truncated regression model where truncation is at zero.
This is quite useful as it implies that the independent DH can be estimated by estimating
the probit and truncated regressions separately 11. Accordingly, a likelihood ratio test
can be used to test the Tobit model versus the independent DH12.
4.2 Variables used
As said earlier, the DH model is estimated separately by area of residence (rural and
urban). The dependent variable is the share of total annual household expenditure on the
education of primary school children in total annual consumption expenditure13. In order
to account for price variability across areas and time, both expenditure items are deated
by using the Malawi National Statistical O¢ ces spatial and temporal deator with base
national, and February/March 2004. The expenditure items include; fees (tuition and
boarding), books and other materials, school uniform, contributions to school building
and maintenance, parental association fees, and other school related expenses. In coming
up with the factors which inuence household investment in the education of children,
we are guided by human capital theory as discussed in the theoretical framework as well
as other empirical studies which have looked at parental investment in education.
We include the age of the youngest primary school going child in the household; this is
motivated by the fact that as children get older education expenditures increase. Age of
11It worth pointing out that in the independent DH unlike the dependent DH exclusion restrictions
are not needed to identify the parameters.
12The log likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) is computed as follows: LR =
 2 [LLT   (LLP + LLTR)]  2k ; where LLT = log likelihood for the Tobit model; LLP = log
likelihood for the Probit model; LLTR= log likelihood for the truncated regression model. LR follows a
Chi-square distribution with degress of freedom k equal to the number of independent variables in the
equations.
13One could alternatively use absolute expenditure on education as the dependent variable. We use
the Engel curve approach in keeping with similar studies looking at household expenditure on education
e.g. Kingdon (2005), Yeuh (2006), and Song et al.(2006).
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the child may also reect the opportunity cost of home production which increases with
age. We include the square of age of the youngest child to measure possible nonlinear-
ities. Household permanent income as proxied by the log of total household per capita
expenditure14 has been found to a¤ect spending on education (e.g. Song et al.2006; Yueh
2006; Kingdon 2005). The expectation as intimated in the theoretical literature is that if
schooling is a pure investment good and capital markets are perfect then income should
not inuence spending on education, however income will inuence spending on edu-
cation if it is a consumption good and/or it is an investment good but there are credit
constraints. We also include a variable which captures proportion of children who are day
scholars in a household. This variable is dened as the number of day scholars divided
by the number of children in the household.
The number of children in a household may also a¤ect whether or not a household spends
on their education, and if so how much. In the literature there are basically two opposite
ndings regarding the impact of number of children on investment in human capital. The
rst nding which conrms the quantity-quality trade o¤ is that having more children
negatively impacts on investment in human capital (Gertler and Glewwe 1990). The
other nding is that having more children actually increases human capital formation
as it ensures that each child requires less time for home production (Al-Samarrai and
Reilly 2000). Additionally, we include the square of number children in the household to
measure the possibility that expenditures diminish with more children.
Employment status of parents may be positively related to expenditures on a childs
primary education as it may inuence their perception of the relationship between hu-
man capital investments and returns on those investments. Studies by Haveman et al.
(1991) and Ribar (1993) in the US, nd a signicant and positive relationship between
mothers employment during a childs teenage years, and high school completion but nd
no signicant e¤ect on the same of the fathers employment. In this study, we measure
the employment status of both parents by whether they work for a wage or not. The
educational level of parents is expected to have a positive e¤ect on investment in educa-
tion. The theoretical explanation of this expectation is that parents with higher levels
of education are more likely to perceive greater future benets or returns on investing
in their childrens education and, thus may be willing to sacrice more for these future
returns. More educated parents expect that their children will exhibit greater promise
14We use consumption expenditure other than income for two reasons. First, particularly in an agricul-
tural economy such as Malawi, income is often very lumpy. Farming households receive a large amount
of cash income in May and June after the harvest, and receive very little the rest of the year. In con-
trast, households are constantly expending their income and consuming. Consumption expenditure is a
smoother measure of welfare through time than is income. In other words, consumption can be viewed as
realized welfare, whereas income is more a measure of potential welfare (Murkhejee and Benson 2003).
Second, in Malawi much of household income is derived from self-employed business or subsistence-
oriented agricultural production. Assigning income values to the proceeds of these enterprises is often
problematic (Hentschel and Lanjouw 1996).
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and thus will be more willing to invest in their childs education (Becker 1981; Becker
and Tomes 1976). At the empirical level, several studies which look at the relationship
between attainment and parental education support this human capital perspective (e.g.
Ray 2000; Gertler and Glewwe 1990; Song et al. 2006; Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu
2007).
Parental age may inuence expenditures on childrens primary education. Age reects
experience, and the expectation is that with age comes the ability to appreciate the
benets and returns on investments in education. As argued by Mauldin et al. (2001),
if parents are older at the time their children are in primary and secondary schools, they
will be more nancially secure as well and be more willing to sacrice a larger proportion
of income for their childrens education. We thus include the age of the mother and father
as well as the square of ages for both parents to measure the possibility of nonlinearities.
Studies by Case and Deaton (1999), Lavy (1996), and Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) have
found signicant negative e¤ects of distance to the nearest primary school. Distance to
the nearest primary school can be a measure of the quality of access of primary schools,
it can also reect the direct cost of primary education. Households are less likely to
invest in the education of their children if for example schools are very far. In this study,
distance to nearest primary school measured in kilometres is set equal to zero if there is
a primary school in the community.
As has been discussed in the theoretical literature, there may be bias in spending against
a particular sex. Besides, some empirical studies have found evidence of son preference in
spending for example, Song et al.(2006) and Yueh (2006) for China and Kingdon (2005)
for India. In order to capture the possibility of gender bias in spending, we construct a
variable dened as;
10X
i=1
Hg
H
, where Hg is the number of household members in age-gender
group g and H is the household size15. We distinguish ten age and gender categories;
ages 0-6, 7-15, 16-19, 20-55, and over 55 for each gender. Since we are using aggregate
household education expenditure data, this variable can give an indirect test of gender
bias in spending. In particular, to check for evidence of di¤erences in spending between
primary school going boys and girls we are concerned with the coe¢ cients of the age-
gender variable for the ages 7-15 for both sexes. If the coe¢ cients are signicant and
di¤erent that is evidence of preference for a particular sex in spending16.
We control for regional xed e¤ects by including a three class regional dummy for the
north, centre, and south. The variables are formally dened in the appendix Table A1.
15In the estimation the age-gender category over 55 for males is omitted to avoid multicollinearity
since the categories sum up to one in each household.
16Testing for equality of coe¢ cients in both participation and expenditure equations for all groups of
household is done by using a Wald test. This approach to testing for gender bias was rst proposed by
Deaton (1989).
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4.3 Estimation issues
The log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, and this may lead to biased
and inconsistent results. One possible channel of endogeneity is that the log of per capita
expenditure and spending on education can be jointly determined through labour supply
decisions in the sense that a decision to send children to school may be jointly determined
with a decision to send the children to work to supplement household income. Another
route for endogeneity would be that parents with a good taste for the education of their
children may work harder so they are able to pay for their schooling (Kingdon 2005).
We address this problem in both the participation and expenditure decision equations.
In the participation equation we use the Rivers and Vuong (1989) procedure for discrete
choice models, and in the expenditure equation we use the Smith and Blundell (1986)
procedure for limited dependent variable models. The two procedures are analogous and
they are done in two stages. In the rst stage, a reduced form regression of an endogenous
variable is regressed using ordinary least squares (OLS) on exogenous variables including
instruments, and residuals are predicted. In the second stage, the predicted residuals are
included in the participation equation (Rivers and Vuong procedure) and the expenditure
equation (Smith and Blundell procedure) including the endogenous variable. A simple
t-test of the coe¢ cient on the residual tests the null hypothesis of exogeneity. We use
household assets namely hectares of land, and its square as instrumental variables for log
of per capita expenditure17. An instrumental variable (IV) must be correlated with the
endogenous variable (log of per capita expenditure in our case), but uncorrelated with
the error term for the participation equation or the expenditure equation i.e. the IV must
be redundant in the participation equation or the expenditure equation once log of per
capita expenditure is included. Thus, the e¤ect of the IV on school spending must work
through log of per capita expenditure only. As is shown later, land and its square are
correlated with log of per capita expenditure. Land is an illiquid asset, and therefore is
unlikely to be sold in the short term to cover schooling expenses (Kingdon 2005).
4.4 Data and descriptives
The data used in the study come from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey
(IHS2). This is a nationally representative sample survey designed to provide information
on the various aspects of household welfare in Malawi. The survey was conducted by the
National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2004 -April 2005. The survey collects information
from a nationally representative sample of 11,280 households. This data contains detailed
information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the households. The
17Similar instruments are used by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994), and Glewwe and Ilias (1996).
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survey also collects annualized household education information which includes household
expenditure on primary, secondary, and tertiary education, for household members aged 5
and above. The expenditure items are; school fees (tuition and boarding), books and other
materials, school uniform, contributions to school building and maintenance, parental
association fees, and other school related expenses. In this study, we use husband-wife
and single-parent families with at least one child in primary school. We do this for two
reasons. Firstly, the survey does not record the parental characteristics of children who
do not live with their parents, thus this restriction allows us to examine the impact
of parental characteristics as discussed in section 4.2. Secondly, schooling decisions are
cumulative in nature such that the circumstances in which a person was raised in as a
child are more relevant than current ones (Glick and Sahn 2000). This restriction may
potentially lead to a non random sample (i.e. a selected sample), which may bias our
results. Specically, if children are fostered out or older children leave the house to marry
or work, this may lead to a selected sample of children who are di¤erent from those
that have left. Since fostering increases with age and the likelihood of children leaving to
marry or work also increases with age, by focussing on primary education, we somewhat
mitigate the fears of selection bias.
Descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis for families with nonzero
expenditures and for the full sample by area of residence are presented in Tables 1 and
2. The full sample comprises households with primary school going children, with zero
expenditures and nonzero expenditures on education. In Table 1, we report sample means
of annual household expenditure on primary education (absolute expenditure) and the
share of annual expenditure on primary education in total household consumption ex-
penditure; our dependent variable. The table also presents results of tests of statistical
signicance of the di¤erences in expenditure between rural and urban households. The
results show that there are di¤erences between rural and urban households. In terms of
absolute expenditure, rural households spend less on average compared to urban house-
holds. The share of education spending out of total household consumption expenditure
for rural households is lower than that of urban households. These di¤erences hold for
both the full and spending samples. Additionally, the di¤erentials are statistically sig-
nicant. Looking at the various components of expenditure on education, we notice that
urban spending on all items is signicantly higher than that of rural households. We also
observe that for urban households tuition takes up a big part of spending, whereas for
rural households most of the spending is done on uniforms.
Table 2, presents results of summary statistics of explanatory variables used in the study
by area of residence for the full sample and the sample of households which actually
spend on education. The table also reports whether the di¤erences in the variables are
statistically signicant. With the rural-urban demarcation of the sample, we have 3739
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rural households and 676 urban households with primary school going children. Of these
full samples, 2782 rural households (74.4% of sample) and 548 urban households (81.1%
of sample) have nonzero expenditures on primary school children. Thus suggesting that
compared to rural areas, there are more households in urban areas with positive ex-
penditures on education. In terms of the proportion of children going to day schools,
the results show that rural households have a higher number (90%) compared to 87%
for urban households. The di¤erence is statistically signicant. Urban households have
generally signicantly better parental characteristics. Specically, in urban areas a sig-
nicantly higher proportion of both mothers and fathers work for a wage, and have more
years of schooling compared to their rural counterparts. The results show that the urban
households have signicantly nearer schools compared to rural ones. Looking at the age-
gender demographics for the primary school going age (7-15), the results suggest that
there are di¤erences between the two areas with rural households having a signicantly
higher proportion of boys (16%) compared to 13% for urban households. In terms of the
proportion of girls of the schooling going age, we nd no signicant di¤erence between
the two areas. Essentially, we observe that just like expenditure on education discussed
earlier; there are di¤erences in the characteristics across area of residence. We discuss
the econometric results in the next section.
5 Econometric results
The descriptive statistics show that there are di¤erences in expenditure on primary ed-
ucation as well as characteristics between rural and urban households. In the light of
this, we formally test the hypothesis that households in rural and urban areas are not
di¤erent with respect to their investment in childrens education18. We essentially seek
to investigate whether or not coe¢ cients for the di¤erent variables are the same for rural
and urban households. This is done by conducting a pooling test; a failure of pooling
between the two groups would indicate that they are di¤erent. To conduct the pooling
test, we use the likelihood ratio (LR) test. For comparison, the hypothesis is tested using
both the DH and the Tobit models. The unrestricted regression is estimated with sep-
arate urban and rural households, and the restricted regression with the pooled sample
using an area of residence dummy variable rural. If we denote the log-likelihoods for
the urban, rural and pooled samples respectively as LLurban; LLrural; LLpooled with corre-
sponding number of parameters kurban; krural; kpooled , then the LR statistic which follows
18Since we do not have information on whether the expenditures are on private or government primary
schools, in our preliminary estimations we dropped tuition fees as we gured this may be a major factor
between urban and rural areas, in the sense that there is a predominance of private schools which tend
to be expensive in urban areas. However, our econometric results were by and large una¤ected by this
exclusion, so we retained tuition fees in all estimations in the study.
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a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom (krural + kurban)  kpooled is given by;
LR =  2 [LLpooled   (LLrural + LLurban)]  2(krural+kurban) kpooled (5)
Results of the pooling tests are presented in Table 3. The results for both the DH and
Tobit models show that rural and urban households are di¤erent, and thus pooling the
rural and urban households is inappropriate. This means that the DH model or the Tobit
model should be estimated separately for the two areas. The next issue that we address
is whether the DH or Tobit is the right model for our data. Basically, we seek to ascertain
by using the LR test whether there is another censoring mechanism as represented by the
participation equation. Results of the tests are reported in Table 4. The LR test results
favour the use of the independent DH as opposed to the Tobit model. This implies that
there are two decision processes underlying spending on education; households decide
whether or not to spend, and if yes, how much. We therefore discuss results of the DH
for the two groups of households.
As discussed earlier the log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, we tested
for this using the Rivers and Vuong procedure for the participation equation and the
Smith and Blundell procedure for the expenditure equation as outlined earlier. We nd
that the log of per capita expenditure is endogenous in the expenditure equation only for
rural households. To ensure comparability in terms of number of variables, we included
residuals from the reduced form regression for urban households in the urban expenditure
equation as well. The reduced form regressions of log of per capita expenditure for both
areas reported in the appendix Table A2, show that the instrumental variables land and
its square perform reasonably well as they are signicantly correlated with the log of per
capita expenditure.
The nal maximum likelihood results of the DH are presented in Table 5. Since the
Tobit model has been rejected in favour of the DH, our discussion of the results is based
on the DH but we show results of the Tobit model (Table A3 in the appendix) for
comparison. The results generally show that some variables are signicant for one group
but insignicant for another; an indication of the rural-urban di¤erences alluded to earlier.
The age of the youngest child is signicant and negative only in the participation equation
for rural households. This suggests that parents in rural areas are less likely to spend
on the education of children as they get older. This perhaps reects the opportunity
cost of sending children to school, that is as they get older they can be a source of labor
for agriculture, and other income generating activities to supplement parental income.
This opportunity cost may not be as high in urban areas. The level of income as proxied
by the log of per capita expenditure signicantly increases the likelihood of spending on
education and how much is spent for both rural and urban households. The results
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therefore suggest that income matters at both the extensive and intensive margins for
the two groups of households. Mauldin et al. (2001) also nd that income has positive
and signicant e¤ect on household spending on education at both decision levels in the
US. We cannot compare the magnitudes of these coe¢ cients of income in the two areas,
but later in the next section we compare the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients by computing
elasticities. Su¢ ce to say that the positive and signicant e¤ect of income indicates that
spending on education is considered a normal consumption good. It may also indicate
the presence of credit constraints in both areas.
For rural households, having a higher proportion of children going to day schools signif-
icantly increases the probability of spending on them but lowers the share of education
expenditure. For urban households having more day scholars lowers the chance of spend-
ing on primary education but it has no impact on the share of education expenditure in
total expenditure. We nd that the number of children inuences positively and signi-
cantly the share of education expenditure for rural households, but does not signicantly
a¤ect the likelihood of spending on education19. For urban households having more chil-
dren increases the likelihood that a household will spend on their education but does
not a¤ect the share of expenditure. This positive e¤ect conforms with the argument by
Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) that the more children a household has, the less is the time
needed for household production activities, and hence the higher will be the investment
in their education. This however, contradicts an argument by Gertler and Glewwe (1990)
that larger families may derive less utility from sending an additional child to school if
some are already enrolled. This lower enrolment resulting from having many children
could be reected in lower spending. This also runs counter to the expectation that with
more children there is more competition for resources.
In terms of parental employment, the results show that for rural and urban households
a fathers and a mothers employment signicantly increases the share of expenditure
on education as well as the chance that they will spend on children. This suggests that
holding other things constant, employed parents will invest more on their children. With
respect to education, we nd that the education of both the mother and the father
positively and signicantly a¤ects the decision whether or not to spend as well as how
much to spend on the primary education of their children in both rural and urban areas.
Thus, ceteris paribus the higher is the parental human capital, the higher will be the
investment in schooling of children. These results are in line with ndings by Song et
19It is worth recognizing that the number of children is potentially endogenous, if there is a quantity-
quality trade o¤ where parents prefer fewer children with a good education. Besides, if there is son
preference which a¤ects expenditure on childrens education, this may also a¤ect family size. We control
for the possibility of son preference as discussed earlier. Since we have no valid instruments; we addressed
the simultaneity problem arising from the quantity-quality trade by re-estimating the DH models for all
groups without number of children; our results largely remained unchanged thus giving us condence
that our results may not be biased due to simultaneity.
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al. (2006) for rural China where they found that the educational level of both parents
positively impacts household spending on education. We cannot compare the magnitudes
of the DH coe¢ cients of the employment and education for parents in the two areas,
however this issue is taken up later in the next section where we compute elasticities.
These comparisons allow us to say something about the possible di¤erences in the impact
of the two variables between parents and between the two areas.
The quality of access of primary schools as proxied by distance to the nearest primary
school has a negative impact on the participation and the expenditure decisions of both
rural and urban households20. This suggests that households will be less likely to spend on
primary education if the schools are far away and if they do actually decide to spend, the
amount spent will be lower21. In terms of the age-gender demographics, the results suggest
that having more primary school going boys (mal15h) and girls (fem15h) signicantly
and positively impacts on the participation and the expenditure decision levels of rural
households. The same is true for urban households. We investigate further to check
evidence of gender bias against girls by conducting Wald tests of the equality of the
coe¢ cients for mal15h and fem15h in the two areas. Results of the tests are shown
at the bottom of Table 5. The test results indicate that for rural households there is
gender bias against girls at both the participation and expenditure decision levels. For
urban households, the Wald test results indicate that there are no statistically signicant
gender di¤erences at both the intensive and extensive margins. Thus, the Wald tests
show evidence of gender bias in favour of boys in rural areas only. Interestingly, we observe
that when the Tobit model is used (see Table A3 in the appendix), there is no evidence
of gender bias in both areas. This is in conformity with a nding by Kingdon (2005)
who shows that when a variant22 of the DH model is used more evidence of gender bias
in school spending is found in India as compared to using a single equation model. This
underlines the importance of the participation decision when modelling a dependent
variable with excess zeros. We complement the Wald tests results by comparing the
magnitude of elasticities of mal15h and fem15h in the next section.
20Distance to the nearest primary school can be endogenous, for example some communities may have
a leadership which values education and is more vocal and progressive. This may a¤ect both household
schooling decisions as well as placement of schools. Another possible source of endogeniety is that
parents with high aspirations for their children may "vote with their feet" by moving to areas where
schools are nearer. And this unobserved high aspiration by parents may a¤ect both distance to schooling
and schooling decisions. We dont have valid instruments for distance to nearest primary school, so
we re-estimated the models without distance to nearest primary school and our results were marginally
di¤erent from those with distance to nearest primary school thus giving us some level of assurance about
the reliability of our results.
21If the distance to the nearest primary school is thought of as a measure of the direct cost of primary
education, then the result suggests that households will be less likely to spend on primary education if
costs are high and if they do actually decide to spend, the amount spent will be lower.
22The model used by Kingdon (2005) assumes that once a household decides to spend there are no
zero expenditures. Essentially, implying that the rst hurdle dominates the second hurdle.
19
We have assessed the impact of di¤erent regressors on expenditure, and found some to
be signicant in the levels equation only while others are signicant in the participation
equation only or both the levels and participation equations. Further to that, some vari-
ables have been found to have opposite signs in the two decision levels. As noted by
Yen (2005), when examining the impact of explanatory variables, the presence of para-
meter estimates with opposite signs in the participation and level equations complicate
the interpretation of the estimated e¤ects. Thus, the impact of explanatory variables
can be better explored by computing elasticities. It is worth noting that the elasticities
unlike the coe¢ cients we have just discussed also allow us to talk about the economic
signicance of the variables used.
5.1 Elasticities in the independent DH
The interpretation of coe¢ cients in limited dependent variable models is complicated,
and to overcome this the e¤ect of explanatory variables on the unconditional expectation
of the dependent variable (Yi) as measured by elasticities is decomposed into an e¤ect on
the probability of a positive expenditure and an e¤ect on conditional expenditure (Yen
2005)23.
The unconditional expectation of Yi in the independent DH is given as;
E(Yi) = Pr(Yi > 0)E(YijYi > 0) (6)
Where the probability of expenditure is given by;
Pr(Yi > 0) = Pr(Z
0
i+ "i > 0; X
0
i + i > 0) (7)
= Pr ("i >  Z 0i; i >  X 0i)
=  (Z 0i) 

X 0i


23This follows a proposed decomposition by McDonald and Mo¢ t (1980) for Tobit models on the e¤ect
of a regressor on the unconditional expectation.
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And the conditional expectation of Yi is expressed as24;
E(YijYi > 0) = X 0i + E (ij"i >  Z 0i; i >  X 0i) (8)
= X 0i +

 (Z 0i) 

X 0i

 1
  

X 0i


 (Z 0i)
= X 0i +


X0i




X0i


The elasticities of the unconditional expectation of Yi with respect to the continuous
regressors are computed by di¤erentiating equations 7 and 8, and using the adding up
property, equation 6. Formally, the elasticity of a continuous variable j which appears in
both the participation and the expenditure equations is written as follows:
UCj =
@E(Yi)
@Xij
Xij
E(Yi)
(9)
=
@ Pr(Yi > 0)
@Xij
Xij
Pr(Yi > 0)
+
@E(YijYi > 0)
@Xij
Xij
E(YijYi > 0)
= Pj + 
C
j
Equation 9, shows that the elasticity of the unconditional expectation of Yi with respect
to a continuous variable j which appears in both the participation and the expenditure
equations (UCj ); is simply a sum of the elasticity of the probability of observing a positive
expenditure (Pj ) and the elasticity of conditional expenditure (
C
j ).
These elasticities of the probability, conditional level and unconditional level for con-
tinuous variables are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Table 6 reports
the elasticities for the probability, conditional and unconditional levels of some selected
variables for the DH. For comparison, we present the elasticities for the probability, con-
ditional and unconditional levels of some selected variables for the Tobit model in the
appendix Table A4. The elasticity of probability for both rural and urban households
with respect to the log of per capita expenditure which proxies permanent income is
positive and signicant implying that spending on education is considered a normal item.
The same holds true for the elasticity of conditional and unconditional levels for the log
of per capita expenditure. It is worth noting that rural households have greater than
one elasticities of the probability, conditional level and unconditional level compared to
urban households. This means that for rural households spending on the schooling of
children is more sensitive to income compared to urban households, and thus schooling
24The probability of positive expenditure and conditional expectation of expenditure are based on the
error term properties given earlier. See Yen (2005) for details of the same when errors are dependent.
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is a luxury good in rural areas25.
The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional level with respect to
parental employment and education are positive and signicant in both areas. However,
we note two things, rstly the elasticities for parental employment and education are
higher for rural areas, and secondly, the elasticities for mothers employment and education
are higher than those of fathers in both areas. These ndings indicate that parental
characteristics have a bigger impact on spending in rural areas, and that a mothers
characteristics have a larger impact on spending compared to a fathers. If one thinks
of the employment status and education of the mother as a reection of the bargaining
power of the mother in the household, this would imply that childrens education benets
from an improvement in the bargaining position of the mother. Besides, this result has
intergenerational implications for human capital formation in that more female education
entails more educated mothers, and hence more education for children.
The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional level with respect to
the distance to the nearest primary school are negative and statistically signicant for
both areas. We observe that the elasticities are larger for urban areas as compared to
rural areas suggesting that urban households are more sensitive to the quality of access
of primary schools. The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional
level with respect to the proportion of primary school going boys (mal15h) and girls
(fem15h) are positive, statistically signicant and economically substantial for rural and
urban households. In addition, we also note that for rural households the elasticities
of probability, conditional level and unconditional level for boys are larger than those
for girls suggesting a bias against girls. The computed elasticities for urban households
are not noticeably di¤erent. These elasticities therefore reinforce evidence shown earlier
using Wald tests that boys are favored when it comes to whether or not to spend as well
as how much to spend in rural households, but there is no evidence of school spending
gender bias in urban households. Just like the raw coe¢ cients discussed earlier for the
Tobit model, we nd that the elasticities (see appendix Table A4) are both statistically
insignicant and economically not very di¤erent from each other. Thus, when a single
equation model is used we nd no evidence of gender bias in spending in both rural and
urban households.
Both the descriptive and econometric results show that there are di¤erences in household
investment in the human capital of primary school children. Specically, the results indi-
cate rural and urban households are di¤erent both in terms of how much they spend and
the e¤ect of di¤erent characteristics on their spending behavior. We therefore know that
25We do not address the possibility that the elasticity of expenditure on education with respect to
income may vary non-monotonically i.e. the income elasticities peak in the middle-income categories
(have a value of greater than one), and diminish for the lower and upper ends of the income distribution
(For details on this possibility see Hashimoto and Heath 1995).
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there are these di¤erences, but we dont know why there are these di¤erences. Are these
di¤erences largely due to di¤erences in characteristics or due to di¤erences in behavior?
The next section addresses this issue.
6 Extending the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to
the independent DH model
The observed rural-urban di¤erences in household investment in the education of primary
school children call for an understanding of what explains these di¤erences. This section
therefore provides a comprehensive analysis of the rural-urban di¤erential in household
expenditure on education. To achieve this, we propose an extension of the decomposition
technique proposed independently by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) for linear models
to the independent DH model, which is a nonlinear model. The technique has almost
exclusively been used in the labour economics literature to study gender wage discrim-
ination (e.g. Appleton et al. 1999; Sicillian and Grossberg 2001; Neuman and Oaxaca
2004), and to the best of our knowledge our study is the rst to apply the technique to
study household expenditure. The proposed decomposition isolates the expenditure gap
into a characteristic e¤ect, which is a part of the di¤erential explained by di¤erences in
social-economic characteristics, and a coe¢ cient e¤ect which is the part of the gap which
is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. In this study, we interpret the coe¢ cient e¤ect as
part of gap which is due to household behavior26.
As will be demonstrated later, the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method can-
not be used to decompose the DH as it is strictly meant for linear models. For nonlinear
models; Fairlie (1999, 2005) has proposed the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for logit
and probit models, Bauer and Sinning (2005, 2008) have proposed an extension of the
same for Tobit models. To derive the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the independent
DH; consider the DH as expressed in equation 3, which is estimated separately for two
groups of households, m = (U;R), where; U =urban and R =rural households. We want
to decompose the gap in average expenditure share between urban and rural households,
MDH= E(YU)   E(YR), by using the following sample counterpart M^DH = YU   YR .
The sample average expenditure share for group m is given as Ym =
NmP
i=1
Y^im
Nm
; where Nm is
the sample size for group m: The "hat" denotes sample estimates. The Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition of the independent DH similar to that for the Tobit by Bauer and Sinning
(2005, 2008) is expressed in terms of unconditional expectations of the dependent variable
(Yi). The unconditional expectation for the two groups estimated separately is expressed
26The coe¢ cient e¤ect in the labor economics literature is interpreted as a measure of discrimination.
23
as follows27;
E(Yim) = Pr(Yim > 0)E(YimjYim > 0) (10)
Where the probability of expenditure is given by;
Pr(Yim > 0) =  (Z
0
imm) 

X 0imm
m

(11)
And the conditional expectation of Yi is expressed as;
E(YimjYim > 0) = X 0imm +
m

X0imm
m



X0imm
m
 (12)
Three things need to be noted about equation 10. Firstly, the unconditional expectation
E(Yim) is not equal to E(Xim)0m as is the case in linear models on which the standard
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is based28 ;29. As discussed earlier, imposing a linear model
on a dependent variable with excess zeros leads to biased and inconsistent coe¢ cients, and
therefore using coe¢ cients from the linear model would give a misleading decomposition
as well. Secondly, the unconditional expectation is not equal to that of Tobit as it has
another censoring mechanism,  (Z 0imm) which represents participation; this means that
we cannot use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Tobit models as developed by Bauer
and Sinning (2005, 2008). Finally, equation 10 shows that the unconditional expectation
has the standard error of the error term of the expenditure equation,m. This may a¤ect
the magnitude of the decomposition and therefore has to be included in the decomposi-
tion. As a result, there are several possible decompositions of the mean di¤erence MDH ,
depending on which m is used in the counterfactual part of the decomposition.
We therefore derive two possible decompositions for the independent DH30:
27For ease of exposition, we have reproduced equation 6.
28It is worth noting the di¤erence in terminology used here; the conditional expectation in linear
models is given by E(Y jX) while the conditional expectation in limited dependent variable models (e.g.
Tobit, Truncated, DH models) is expressed as E(Y jY > 0).
29Assuming a linear model Yim = X 0i+i for illustration; the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
is based on the property of linear models with an intercept that the mean of a dependent variable is
equal to the mean of the regressors evaluated at their respective estimated coe¢ cients i.e. Yim =
Xim^m: Hence, the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is given as; YU   YR =

XU ^U   XR^R

= 
XU   XR

^U +

^U   ^R

XR:
Where the "overbars" denote sample means and the "hats" denote sample estimates.
30These two possibilities are similar to that of Bauer and Sinning (2005) for the Tobit.
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MDHR1 =
h
EU;U;U (YiU)  EU;U;R (YiR)
i
(13)
+
h
EU;U;R (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
and
MDHU1 =
h
EU;U;U (YiU)  EU;U;U (YiR)
i
(14)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
Where Em;m;m (Yim) denotes the unconditional expectation of Yim evaluated at the
parameter vectors m; m and the error standard error m. The di¤erence between the
two decompositions is that equation 13 treats the standard error as part of the variables
while equation 14 treats it as part of the coe¢ cients.
The above decompositions use the urban coe¢ cients in the counterfactual; this implies
that if there was no gap in average expenditure share, the expenditure prole of the urban
would prevail. We can alternatively use the rural coe¢ cients; this implies that if there
was no gap in average expenditure, the expenditure structure of the rural areas would
exist. When the rural coe¢ cients are used the two possibilities are written as31 :
MDHU2 =
h
ER;R;U (YiU)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
(15)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;U (YiR)
i
and
MDHR2 =
h
ER;R;R (YiU)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
(16)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
The rst term in the decompositions (equations 13 -16) captures part of the average
expenditure share gap between the urban and rural households attributable to di¤erences
in covariates. This is the characteristic e¤ect. This basically is the part of the gap in
average expenditure share between the two groups of households assuming that both
31This provides a robustness check of our results to choice of reference group. When decompositions
give di¤erent conclusions depending on the reference group used, an index number problem is said to
obtain. Various attempts have been made in the literature to resolve the index number problem for
linear models (e.g. Reimers 1983; Cotton 1988; Neumark 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).
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types had the same coe¢ cients (behavior) but di¤erent endowments. Thus, this is a
part of the gap explained by di¤erences in characteristics. The last term in equations 13
-16, measures the di¤erence in average expenditure share between the two groups which
is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. This is the coe¢ cient e¤ect. It is part of the gap
which is unexplained by the di¤erences in characteristics. Essentially, it is part of the
gap assuming that urban and rural households had the same characteristics but di¤erent
coe¢ cients (behavior). So for example, assuming that rural and urban households have
the same income levels, this income may be a more important factor (implying a bigger
coe¢ cient) to rural households as compared to urban ones in their spending decisions.
In order to conduct the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as given in equations 13 to 16, the
following sample equivalent of the unconditional expectation (equation 10) is employed;
T

^m; ^m; Zim; Xim; ^m

= N 1m
NmX
i=1
8>><>>:
 (Z 0im^m) 

X0im^m
^m


 
X 0im^m +
m

X0im^m
m



X0
im
^m
^m

! 9>>=>>; (17)
Where ^m; ^m, and ^m denote sample estimates. With this sample counterpart of the
unconditional expectation, equation 13 is estimated by;
M^DHR1 =
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(18)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^R

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
Equation 14 is estimated by;
M^DHU1 =
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^U
i
(19)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
Equation 15 is estimated by;
M^DHU2 =
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(20)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U
i
Finally, equation 16 is estimated by;
M^DHR2 =
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^R

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(21)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^R
i
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If there is only one censoring mechanism, that is  (Z 0im^m) = 1, decompositions 13 to 16
reduce to that of a Tobit with censoring from below at zero, as proposed by Bauer and
Sinning (2005, 2008) for Tobit models. If expenditure is uncensored at zero, decomposi-
tion 13 and 14 are equal and reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with
urban coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual. Similarly, decompositions 15 and 16 are
equal and reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with rural coe¢ cients
used in the counterfactual.
6.1 Detailed decomposition of the independent DH
The decomposition we have just derived gives us the overall or aggregate characteristic
e¤ect and coe¢ cient e¤ect of the independent DH. This while important gives us only a
black box explanation of the di¤erences in education spending between rural and urban
households. It does not for example address the issue of how much of the characteristic
e¤ect arises from di¤erences in household income. Similarly, it does not show how
much of the unexplained gap is due to di¤erences in household income. So a detailed
decomposition which further disaggregates the two e¤ects is important in pinpointing the
major factors driving the spending gap. Knowledge of the major drivers of the spending
gap is important for policy interventions aimed at closing or reducing the gap.
Owing to the di¢ culty in interpreting the detailed decomposition of the coe¢ cient e¤ect,
this study only dwells on the detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect (see
Jones 1983 for more details on the interpretational problems)32. In deriving the detailed
decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect of the independent DH33, we use the average
predicted gaps given in equations 18 to 21.
A detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect denoted as CE for the jth variable
(j = 1; ::K) corresponding to equation 18 is given as;
CEDHR1 =
KX
j=1
W j1
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(22)
for equation 19 it is expressed as;
32In addition to the interpretational problems, a detailed decomposition of the coe¢ cient e¤ect for
dummy variables may su¤er from an invariance problem in the sense that the detailed coe¢ cients e¤ect
attributed to dummy variables is not invariant to the choice of the base category (Oaxaca 1999). Solving
this problem involves the estimation of a normalized regression (see Suits 1984; Gardeazabal and Ugidos
2005; Yun 2005).
33It should be noted that the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Tobit models proposed by Bauer and
Sinning (2005, 2008) does not go as far as the detailed decomposition.
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CEDHU1 =
KX
j=1
W j2
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^U
i
(23)
for equation 20 it represented as;
CEDHU2 =
KX
j=1
W j3
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(24)
and nally, for equation 21 it is denoted as;
CEDHR2 =
KX
j=1
W j4
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^R

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(25)
where the weights (W j) are given as ;
W j1 =

X
j
U
^
j
U
^U
  
ZjU ^
j
U
  XjR ^jU^R   ZjR^jU
XU
^U
^U
  
ZU ^U
  XU ^U^R   ZU ^U
W j2 =

X
j
U ^
j
U
  
ZjU ^
j
U
  XjR^jU   ZjR^jU
XU ^U
  
ZU ^U
  XU ^U   ZU ^U
W j3 =

X
j
U
^
j
R
^U
  
ZjU ^
j
R
  XjR ^jR^R   ZjR^jR
XU
^R
^U
  
ZU ^R
  XU ^R^R   ZU ^R (26)
W j4 =

X
j
U ^
j
R
  
ZjU ^
j
R
  XjR^jR   ZjR^jR
XU ^R
  
ZU ^R
  XU ^R   ZU ^R
and
KX
j=1
W j1 =
KX
j=1
W j2 =
KX
j=1
W j3 =
KX
j=1
W j4 = 1 (27)
The contribution of each variable to the characteristic e¤ect is computed by replacing
the value of one group of households (rural or urban) with that of the other group of
households sequentially one by one34. Assuming that there is only one censoring mecha-
nism, the detailed decompositions in equations 22 to 25 reduce to that of a Tobit model
34The sequential replacement of each variable does not lead to path dependency i.e. it is insensitive
to order of switching (see for example Yun 2004).
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with censoring at zero. Further, if expenditure is uncensored, detailed decompositions
22 to 25 reduce to that of linear models. The corresponding weights for both the Tobit
and linear models reduce to the single equation weights as proposed by Yun (2004).
6.2 Results of the decomposition
We present the results and discussion of the aggregated decomposition in subsection 6.2.1,
this is followed up by results and discussion of the detailed decomposition in subsection
6.2.2.
6.2.1 Results of the aggregate decomposition
Results of the proposed aggregate decomposition are presented in Table 7. For comparison
we also show in Table A5 in the appendix results of the decomposition for the Tobit model.
In both tables, we have also presented the actual average expenditure share gap for the
full sample from Table 1. The results indicate that the DH model compared to the
Tobit model has a lower approximation error, implying that it predicts spending more
accurately. The gap in the predicted average share of primary education expenditure
between rural and urban households is largely due to di¤erences in characteristics. For
example, looking at the expenditure di¤erential when urban coe¢ cients are used in the
counterfactual, and we also use the urban variance in the counterfactual, 66% of the gap
is due to di¤erences in characteristics of the households, and 34% of the gap is explained
by di¤erences in estimated coe¢ cients, hence due to behavioural di¤erences. The two
aggregate e¤ects are statistically signicant at 1%. This result means that if rural and
urban household characteristics were to be equalized, 66% of the spending gap would
vanish. On the other hand, if the behavior of rural and urban households was equalized,
34% of the spending gap would disappear. Similarly, when the urban coe¢ cients and the
rural variance are used in the counterfactual, the results indicate that the characteristic
e¤ect is 67.6% and that 32.4% of the expenditure gap is attributable to di¤erences in
coe¢ cients. Both e¤ects are statistically signicant. In this case 67.6% (32.4%) of the
spending gap would vanish if household characteristics (behavior) were equalized.
The picture that is emerging from the DH decomposition results is that the gap in spend-
ing between rural and urban households largely arises from di¤erences in their character-
istics. The same conclusion is arrived at when we ignore the participation equation and
use Tobit model (see appendix Table A5). It is however worth noting that decomposi-
tion results for the Tobit consistently give a higher (lower) measure of the characteristic
e¤ect (coe¢ cient e¤ect); which suggests that when we when do not account for the fact
that spending is made in two stages, we overestimate (underestimate) the characteristic
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e¤ect (coe¢ cient e¤ect). In a nutshell, the DH and Tobit results suggest that the rural-
urban gap in expenditure is mainly due to di¤erences in characteristics; and this nding
is robust to choice of both variance and coe¢ cients35 used in the counterfactual as well
as ignoring the participation equation as a censoring mechanism.
6.2.2 Results of the detailed decomposition
The aggregated decomposition results presented in the preceding show that the rural-
urban spending gap is predominantly due to di¤erences in characteristics, however this
does not tell us which characteristics are key. In Tables 8 and 9, we present results of
the disaggregated decomposition of the DH. For comparison, we also report results of the
same for the Tobit model in Tables A6 and A7 in the appendix. We have reproduced the
characteristic e¤ect in the top panel of the tables for ease of exposition. The detailed
decomposition results of the DH show that a big part of the characteristic e¤ect is taken
up by six variables namely; household income, fathers and mothers education, fathers
and mothers employment status, and the distance to the nearest primary school. This
conclusion is robust to choice of variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual. For
example, when we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients (rural coe¢ cients)
in the counterfactual, we nd that these six variables constitute 83.59% (90.45%) of the
characteristic e¤ect, and the remainder,16.41% (9.55%) is taken by the other variables.
This implies that these six variables are the major factors behind the rural-urban spending
di¤erence, and that an equalization of these six variables jointly between rural and urban
households would wipe out 83.59% (90.45%) of the characteristic e¤ect.
In terms of the specics, and when we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients
(rural coe¢ cients) in the counterfactual, the results show that di¤erences in household
income as proxied by the log of per capita annual consumption take up 34.38% (36.36%)
of the characteristic e¤ect, and that this e¤ect of income is statistically signicantly
di¤erent from zero. Thus, if household income alone was to be the same between the
two areas, this would take o¤ 34.38% (36.36%) of the characteristic e¤ect. When we
change the variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual, we get a similar story.
This suggests that di¤erences in household income are the largest factor in driving the
rural-urban spending di¤erential. This result conforms to a nding by Al-Samarrai and
Reilly (2000) in Tanzania where they found di¤erences in income to be the largest and
statistically signicant driver of rural-urban enrolment di¤erences. In terms of policy
interventions, this result suggests that e¤orts aimed at reducing the rural-urban poverty
gap would have a signicant contractionary e¤ect on the spending di¤erential.
35The robustness of the decomposition results to choice of counterfactual implies that we do not have
an index number problem.
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When we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients (rural coe¢ cients), the results
also show that di¤erences in the quality of access of primary schools as proxied by the
distance to the nearest primary school have the second largest impact of 17.19% (25.76%)
on the spending gap. So 17.19% (25.76%) of the characteristic e¤ect would be knocked
o¤ as a result of closing the quality of access gap between the two areas. We get a similar
picture when the rural variance and urban or rural coe¢ cients are used the counterfactual.
Thus, reducing the di¤erences in the quality of access of primary schools between the two
areas would go a long way in reducing the spending gap36. Interestingly, the results which
are robust to choice of variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual, show that
di¤erences in mothers characteristics in terms of education and employment contribute
more to the characteristic e¤ect compared to the same for fathers. Hence, targeting
mothers education and employment would have a bigger impact as compared to the
same for fathers in narrowing or closing the spending gap between the two areas. It
is also noteworthy that mothers education has a larger contribution to the gap than
mothers employment. Similar to the econometric results (subsection 5.1), this nding
has intergenerational implications for reducing or closing the rural-urban gap in spending.
Educating more girls entails more educated mothers in future, who would then have a
larger e¤ect on the rural-urban spending gap.
When we ignore the fact that the spending decisions are done in two stages and use
the Tobit model (see Tables A6 and A7 in the appendix), we get conclusions similar to
the DH, albeit with generally higher e¤ects for the six variables, again implying that we
overestimate the impact of the variables when the participation decision is not accounted
for. Again, these conclusions are robust to choice of variance or coe¢ cients used in the
counterfactual. In summary, both results from the DH and the Tobit models show the
six variables to be the major drivers of the spending gap. Thus, policy interventions to
narrow or close the rural-urban household spending gap should focus on reducing the
poverty gap, school quality gaps, mens and womens education and employment gaps,
especially the womens education gap.
7 Conclusions
Using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data, the paper has looked
at household expenditure on the education of own primary school children. We make
a distinction between rural and urban households. With this distinction in mind, we
have looked at two issues. Firstly, we have investigated the factors which inuence a
36If the distance to the nearest primary school is thought of as a measure of the direct cost of primary
education, then the result means that reducing the di¤erences in cost of primary education between the
two areas would go a long way in reducing the spending gap.
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households expenditure decision. Specically, here we have looked at two interrelated
questions; what factors inuence a households decision to spend or not (the participation
decision), and then what factors inuence how much is spent (the expenditure decision).
We have found that there are di¤erences in the impact of factors by area of residence. It
has been established that the level of household income in rural and urban areas positively
and signicantly impacts both the participation and expenditure decisions. Computed
elasticities have shown that spending on education by rural households is more sensitive to
changes in income compared to urban households, suggesting that spending on education
in rural areas is a luxury good. We have found that a fathers and mothers employment
has a bigger impact on spending (at both decision levels) in rural areas compared to
urban areas. For both areas, a mothers employment and education has been found
to exert a bigger inuence on spending compared to a fathers. We have shown that
urban households compared to their rural counterparts are more sensitive to the quality
of access of primary schools as measured by the distance to the nearest primary school.
The study has found evidence of gender bias in school spending in rural areas only.
The second issue addressed in the study relates to why there are these di¤erences between
rural and urban households, and we have dealt with this issue by conducting a decom-
position analysis. We have proposed an extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
technique to the independent DH. The extension has been done at two levels namely;
the aggregated decomposition which shows just how much of the spending gap is due to
di¤erences in characteristics (characteristic e¤ect) and how much is due to di¤erences
in the estimated coe¢ cients (coe¢ cient e¤ect), and the disaggregated decomposition of
the characteristic e¤ect which shows the contribution of each variable to the character-
istic e¤ect. Results from the aggregated decomposition show that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential arises from di¤erences in characteristics and about 34% is due
to behavioural di¤erences (estimated coe¢ cients) between rural and urban households.
This conclusion is robust to choice of coe¢ cients and variance used in the counterfac-
tual. It is also robust to assuming that the zeros in expenditure are entirely a result of a
corner solution. The results from the disaggregated decomposition show that household
income, parental education and employment, and quality of access of primary schools
are the major factors behind the spending gap. It has been shown that the di¤erence in
household income between the two areas is the largest contributing factor, followed by
quality of access of primary schools. Further, it has been demonstrated that di¤erences
in mothers employment and education have a larger e¤ect relative to the fathers on the
spending di¤erenti
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Table 1: Annual primary education expenditure
Rural Urban
Full sample Spending sample Full sample Spending sample Gap 1 Gap 2
Expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Absolute 379.97 510.68     4696.00 6863.38 6352.70*** 4316.03***
Share 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.022 0.01*** 0.017***
Disaggregated absolute expenditure of full sample
Tuition 35.48 2945.85 2910.27***
Books 74.81 250.63 175.82***
Uniform 160.64 343.62 182.98***
Boarding 13.05 124.06 111.01***
Building 53.78 82.78 28.89*
PTA 10.55 233.23 222.68***
Other 31.46 715.83 684.37***
Notes: The full sample is made up of all households with school going children, and the spending sample is
made of households with nonzero expenditure on education. Absolute is the absolute expenditure while share
is absolute expenditure divided by household annual consumption expenditure. We use two-tailed tests to test
the significance of the differences (gaps) in expenditure between rural and urban. The significance asterisks
are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Expenditure is measured in Malawi Kwacha (MK).
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Table 2: Sample descriptives of explanatory variables
Rural Urban
Full sample Spending sample Full sample Spending sample Gap 1 Gap 2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Household characteristics
agelast   7.97    7.65   9.30 8.57 1.3*** 0.92**
lnrexpa   9.64 9.65 10.07 10.19 0.43*** 0.53***
daysratio   0.90    0.93    0.87 0.88 -0.03 -0.044*
children   3.52    3.68 3.59     3.71 0.04 0.07
Parental characteristics
fathwage    0.71    0.72    0.82     0.81 0.10** 0.11***
mothwage   0.23    0.24    0.30     0.30 0.05** 0.07**
edufath   2.02    2.01    5.40     5.75 3.74*** 3.38***
edumoth   0.79    0.76    2.90     3.31 2.55*** 2.11***
agefath   47.77   47.78   47.88    47.87 0.09 0.11
agemoth   43.62   43.23   43.11 42.13 -1.1 -0.51
School characteristics
distprimary   2.75    2.95    1.99 1.30 -1.65*** -0.76***
Age-gender composition of household
mal6h    0.11    0.11    0.09    0.09 -0.02* -0.02
mal15h    0.16    0.16    0.13    0.13 -0.03** -0.03**
mal19h 0.05    0.05    0.05    0.04 -0.003 0.0006
mal55h    0.15    0.15    0.18    0.18 0.03*** 0.02**
malover55h    0.03    0.03    0.04    0.04 0.007 0.01
fem6h    0.11    0.11    0.09    0.10 -0.005 -0.03
fem15h    0.15    0.16    0.16    0.15 -0.008 0.002
fem19h    0.03    0.03    0.04    0.04 0.01 0.01
fem55h    0.18    0.18    0.20    0.21 0.03*** 0.02**
femover55h    0.03 0.02 0.02    0.01 -0.01 -0.01
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Table 2: continued
Rural Urban
Full sample Spending sample Full sample Spending sample Gap 1 Gap 2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Region
north 0.18    0.16    0.29    0.19 0.02 0.12
centre 0.40    0.46    0.44    0.51 0.05 0.04
south 0.42    0.38 0.27   0.31 -0.07 -0.15***
Sample size 3739 2782 676 548
Notes: The full sample is made up of all households with school going children, and the spending sample is
made of households with nonzero expenditure on education. We use two-tailed tests to test the significance of
the differences (gaps) in regressors between rural and urban. For continuous regressors we use mean
differences, and for dummies we use proportional differences. The significance asterisks are defined as
follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: LR test of differences in expenditure on education
Log likelihood value (number of parameters)
Model Pooled Rural Urban      LR statistic df p-value
DH -8306.19(66) -6167.27(64) -2075.03(64) 127.78 62          0.00
Tobit -8398.78(33) -6211.47(32) -2107.53(32) 159.56 31 0.00
Table 4: LR test of Tobit against the independent DH
Model
Group       Independent DH Tobit LR statistic df p-value
Rural -6167.27 -6211.47 88.4 32 0.00
Urban -2075.03 -2107.53 65.0 32 0.00
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Table 5: Results of the independent DH by area of residence
Rural Urban
Variable participation   level participation          level
Household characteristics
agelast -0.05488*** -0.01060 0.30450               0.00072
(0.01614)       (0.00883) (0.23719)             (0.00365)
agelast2          0.00104***      0.00022 -0.00767 -0.00009
(0.00038) (0.00021) (0.00710)             (0.00009)
lnrexpa           0.23207*** 0.05227*** 0.56821*** 0.03576***
(0.05461)       (0.00355)          (0.01981)             (0.01283)
daysratio         0.76890*** -0.11241** -2.86960**             0.02045
(0.10820)       (0.04691)          (1.34249)             (0.01268)
children          0.03128         0.04425*** 1.63650** -0.00016
(0.04129)       (0.01411)          (0.64050)             (0.00804)
children2 -0.00132 -0.00132** -0.14069**             0.00046
(0.00398)       (0.00056)          (0.07013)             (0.00084)
Parental characteristics
fathwage          0.00650*** 0.00756*** 0.04989*** 0.02324***
(0.00138)       (0.00155)          (0.00224)             (0.00296)
mothwage          0.20134*** 0.02023*** 0.64032*** 0.02352***
(0.05835)       (0.00219)          (0.07506)             (0.00132)
edufath           0.00677*** 0.01142*** 0.02940*** 0.00121***
(0.0017)       (0.00259)          (0.00354)             (0.00019)
edumoth 0.00683*** 0.00865*** 0.03234*** 0.00231***
(0.00101)       (0.00148)          (0.00609)             (0.00026)
agefath 0.03908         0.01789 0.90438** -0.01001
(0.03091)       (0.01648)          (0.37120)             (0.00628)
agefath2 -0.00019 -0.00018 -0.00825**             0.00010
(0.00027)       (0.00015) (0.00341)             (0.00006)
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Table 5: continued
Rural Urban
Variable participation   level participation          level
agemoth           0.04274         0.05428*** -0.51033** -0.01090
(0.03055)       (0.01915)          (0.21431)             (0.01311)
agemoth2 -0.00045 -0.00048*** 0.00328*              0.00015
(0.00028)       (0.00018)          (0.00181)             (0.00014)
School characteristics
distprimary -0.00699*** -0.00908*** -0.56579*** -0.02440***
(0.00024)       (0.00084)         (0.00536)             (0.00158)
Age-gender composition of household
mal6h 1.11652** -0.27137 -8.03960              0.20918*
(0.55346)       (0.21291) (5.46235)            (0.11936)
mal15h 1.94601***      0.23238*** 6.16139*** 0.18465***
(0.54091)       (0.0095)          (0.09781)            (0.00321)
mal19h            1.05852* 0.30828 -11.41691*             0.26668*
(0.57515)       (0.22514)          (6.57410) (0.14466)
mal55h           0.43034 0.14724 -12.28649**            0.17875*
(0.50640)       (0.18605)          (5.65072)            (0.10662)
fem6h 0.87586 -0.58748** -7.37600 0.26562**
(0.54953)       (0.25236)          (5.68817)            (0.12612)
fem15h 1.82512***      0.25020*** 7.70956*** 0.29012**
(0.2362) (0.0093)          (0.40535) (0.12162)
fem19h 0.33254         0.36888* -8.92036              0.31863***
(0.59034)       (0.22344)          (5.63699)            (0.12218)
fem55h 0.63089         0.30406 -3.77753 0.12265
(0.59596)       (0.23380)          (4.96818)            (0.10029)
femover55h 1.47903**       0.51368* -4.29883              0.41458**
(0.71350)       (0.28441)          (6.11054) (0.18104)
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Table 5: continued
Rural Urban
Variable participation   level participation          level
Region
north            0.17206***      0.13929* -1.56052* 0.04564
(0.06414)       (0.07396)           (0.87341)            (0.03108)
centre           0.70344***      0.01791 -0.73286 -0.02001*
(0.05767)       (0.02882)          (0.61972) (0.01063)
Controls for endogeneity
residualcons -0.19670** -0.02123
(0.08155)                                (0.01426)
constant -5.71966*** -1.95478* -9.54081 -0.12453
(1.40696)       (1.16150)          (12.48037) (0.33370)
sigma 0.01358***                               0.01182***
(0.00258)                                (0.00160)
Log-likelihood -6167.27 -2075.03
P-values of equality of coefficients of mal15h and fem15h:
0.007 0.002 0.52 0.36
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.  Residualcons is the residual from the reduced form of log per capita consumption expenditure.
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Table 6: Elasticities with respect to selected regressors for the DH
DH
Rural Urban
Variable Prob Cond       Uncond Prob Cond Uncond
lnrexpa      1.889***   1.145*** 2.33***    0.154***    0.177*** 0.331***
(0.209)    (0.055)      (0.264) (0.0083) (0.0012)      (0.0095)
fathwage 0.164*** 0.143***    0.307*** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.256***
(0.006)     (0.007)     (0.013) (0.003) (0.025) (0.028)
mothwage 0.272*** 0.312*** 0.584*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.411***
(0.003)    (0.004)     (0.007) (0.064) (0.114) (0.178)
edufath        0.174***   0.137***    0.311*** 0.114*** 0.0856*** 0.1996***
(0.007)    (0.032)     (0.039) (0.014)     (0.0021) (0.0161)
edumoth        0.441      0.318*** 0.759*** 0.166***    0.224*** 0.390***
(0.030)     (0.073) (0.03) (0.017) (0.023) (0.04)
distprimary -0.018*** -0.047*** -0.065*** -0.296** -0.854*** -1.15***
(0.002)    (0.005)      (0.007)   (0.115) (0.268) (0.383)
mal15h         0.120***   0.66***      0.780*** 0.314*** 0.320*** 0.634***
(0.033)    (0.055) (0.088) (0.077) (0.036) (0.113)
fem15h         0.014***   0.070***     0.084*** 0.317*** 0.321*** 0.638***
(0.003)    (0.004)      (0.007)    (0.024)     (0.013) (0.037)
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 7: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent DH
Using the urban variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.0064*** 0.0066***
(0.0011) (0.0002)
% of raw gap 66% 68.43%
Coefficient effect 0.0032*** 0.0031***
(0.00041) (0.00063)
% of raw gap 34% 31.57%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Using the rural variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.006*** 0.0069***
(0.00057) (0.0015)
% of raw gap 67.6% 71.13%
Coefficient effect 0.0031*** 0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.00082)
% of raw gap 32.4% 28.87%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. The actual expenditure share gap is for the full
sample reproduced from Table 1. Approximation error is the difference between the actual expenditure share
gap and the predicted expenditure share gap.
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Table 8: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the DH using the urban variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0064*** 0.0066***
Of which:
lnrexpa        0.0022*** (0.00072) [34.38%] 0.0024*** (0.00012) [36.36%]
fathwage       0.0003*** (0.000033) [4.69%] 0.00011*** (0.00007) [1.67%]
mothwage       0.00071*** (0.00008) [11.09%] 0.00067 *** (0.000086) [10.15%]
edufath        0.0002*** (0.000065) [3.13%] 0.00019*** (0.000052) [2.88%]
edumoth        0.00084*** (0.000029) [13.13%] 0.0009*** (0.000061) [13.64%]
distprimary    0.0011*** (0.000076) [17.19%] 0.0017*** (0.000063) [25.76%]
other  vars 0.00105 [16.41%] 0.00063 [9.55%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other vars comprises the remaining variables. We have not computed the standard
error for these remaining variables.
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Table 9: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the DH using the rural variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.006*** 0.0069***
Of which:
lnrexpa 0.0019*** (0.00017) [31.67%] 0.0023*** (0.0001)      [33.33%]
fathwage 0.00019*** (0.00003) [3.17%] 0.00017*** (0.000031)    [2.46%]
mothwage 0.00071*** (0.000064) [11.83%] 0.00069*** (0.00002)     [10.00%]
edufath 0.00015*** (0.000047) [2.50%] 0.0001*** (0.00002)     [1.45%]
edumoth 0.00093*** (0.000042) [15.50%] 0.001*** (0.0001)      [14.49%]
distprimary 0.0012*** (0.0001) [20.00%] 0.0016*** (0.00012)     [23.19%]
other  vars 0.00092 [15.33%] 0.00104 [15.07%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other vars comprises the remaining variables. We have not computed the standard
error for these remaining variables.
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Appendix
Table A1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Household characteristics
agelast age of the youngest child
agelast2 Square of age of the youngest child
lnrexpa log of per capita household consumption expenditure
daysratio ratio of day school  going to all school going
children number of children in the household
children2 square of number of children in the household
Parental characteristics
fathwage =1 if father works for a wage,0 otherwise
mothwage =1 if father works for a wage,0 otherwise
edufath Years of education of the father
edumoth Years of education of the mother
agefath Age of the father in years
agefath2 Square of the age of the father
agemoth Age of the mother in years
agemoth2 Square of the age of the mother
School characteristics
distprimary Distance to nearest primary school in kilometres
Age-gender composition of household
mal6h proportion of males aged 0-6 in household
mal15h proportion of males aged 7-15 in household
mal19h proportion of males aged 16-19 in household
mal55h proportion of males aged 20-55 in household
maleover55ha proportion of males aged over 55 in household
fem6h proportion of females aged 0-6 in household
fem15h proportion of females aged 7-15 in household
fem19h proportion of females aged 16-19 in household
fem55h proportion of females aged 20-55 in household
femover55h proportion of females aged over 55 in household
Region
north =1 if household is in the north,0 otherwise.
Centre =1 if household is in the centre, 0 otherwise.
Southa =1 if household is in the south, 0 otherwise.
Notes: a denotes reference category.
50
Table A2: Reduced form regressions of log per capita consumption
Variable Rural Urban
agelast            0.090*** 0.121***
(0.005) (0.045)
agelast2 -0.002*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.001)
agefath -0.143*** -0.007
(0.009) (0.081)
agefath2 0.001*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.001)
agemoth -0.084*** -0.071
(0.010) (0.047)
agemoth2           0.01*** 0.01
(0.002) (0.05)
north -0.001 -0.120
(0.022) (0.158)
centre 0.214*** 0.159
(0.017) (0.149)
Land 0.023*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.001)
Land2 -0.12*** -0.24***
(0.002) (0.014)
constant 14.815*** 10.741***
(0.263) (2.211)
F-test of joint significance of instruments:
F-stat 111 9.64
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
F-test of overall significance:
F-stat 122 19.68
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.2988 0.4564
Notes: The instruments for per capita consumption expenditure are land, its square. The significance asterisks
are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A3: Results of the Tobit by area of residence
Variable Rural Urban
Household characteristics
agelast -0.00044*** 0.00191
(0.00016) (0.00176)
agelast2               0.00001** -0.00008
(0.00000) (0.00005)
lnrexpa                0.00171*** 0.01259**
(0.00018) (0.00611)
daysratio              0.00337*** 0.01023
(0.00072) (0.00670)
children -0.00009 0.00293
(0.00025) (0.00351)
children2              0.00006** 0.00009
(0.00002) (0.00040)
Parental characteristics
fathwage              0.00134*** 0.0164***
(0.00032) (0.00368)
mothwage 0.02277** 0.01213***
(0.00034) (0.00129)
edufath 0.00151*** 0.01206***
(0.00004) (0.00037)
edumoth 0.00431*** 0.01074***
(0.00007) (0.00049)
agefath               0.00059* -0.00024
(0.00030) (0.00216)
agefath2 -0.00000* 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00002)
agemoth 0.00077*** -0.00259*
(0.00023) (0.00144)
52
Table A3: continued
Variable Rural Urban
agemoth2 -0.00001*** 0.00002*
(0.00000) (0.00001)
School characteristics
distprimary -0.00042* -0.01039***
(0.00022) (0.00295)
Age-gender composition of household
mal6h 0.00150 -0.02059
(0.00346) (0.03275)
mal15h 0.00871 0.01916
(0.337) (0.23)
mal19h 0.00763** -0.02771
(0.00361) (0.03614)
mal55h 0.00291 -0.04197
(0.00316) (0.02973)
fem6h -0.00124 -0.00743
(0.00345) (0.03255)
fem15h 0.00867 0.07097
(0.334) (0.977)
fem19h 0.00640* -0.00056
(0.00374) (0.02995)
fem55h 0.00419 -0.00840
(0.00378) (0.03112)
femover55h 0.00874* 0.05879
(0.00448) (0.04469)
Region
north                   0.00097 0.01347
(0.00125) (0.01054)
centre                  0.00266*** -0.00272
(0.00050) (0.00388)
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Table A3: continued
Variable Rural Urban
Controls for endogeneity
residualcons -0.00246* -0.00538
(0.00132) (0.00683)
constant -0.04727** -0.05142
(0.02112) (0.11718)
sigma 0.00813*** 0.01340***
(0.00011) (0.00102)
Log-likelihood -6211.47 -2107.53
P-values of equality of coefficients of mal15h and fem15h:
0.2315 0.5768
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. Residualcons is the residual from the reduced form of log per capita consumption expenditure.
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Table A4: Elasticities with respect to selected regressors for the Tobit
Tobit
Rural Urban
Variable Prob        Cond       Uncond     Prob Cond Uncond
lnrexpa 1.524*** 1.399***     2.923***  .450***     0.461*** 0.911***
(0.043) (0.071) (0.114) (0.098) (0.020) (0.120)
fathwage         0.23***   0.17***       0.40***   0.16***    0.12*** 0.28***
(0.007) (0.005)      (0.001)   (0.015) (0.001) (0.016)
mothwage         0.713*** 0.64***      1.35*** 0.449** 0.412** 0.861***
(0.004)    (0.003)      (0.007)   (0.070) (0.051) (0.120)
edufath 0.431***    0.532***     0.963***  0.252*** 0.407*** 0.659***
(0.046)     (0.034)      (0.08) (0.033) (0.064) (0.097)
edumoth 0.869***   0.761***     1.630*** 0.785*** 0.658*** 1.443
(0.068) (0.056) (0.124) (0.025) (0.066) 0.091)
distprimary -0.089* -0.068* -0.157* -0.988*** -0.728*** -1.716***
(0.046)    (0.035)      (0.080) (0.303) (0.211) (0.504)
mal15h             0.104 0.079 0.182 -0.116 -0.086 -0.202
(0.40)     (0.30) (0.71) (0.186) (0.136) (0.322)
fem15h             0.102 0.078 0.181 -0.082 -0.061 -0.143
(0.040) (0.030) (0.070) (0.223) (0.164) (0.388)
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A5: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the Tobit
Using the urban variance
Actual average expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted average expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0044*** 0.0046***
(0.0004) (0.0001)
% of raw gap 74.6% 77.97%
Coefficient effect 0.0015*** 0.0013***
(0.00021) (0.00041)
% of raw gap 25.4% 22.03%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Using the rural variance
Actual average expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted average expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0048*** 0.0045***
(0.00021) (0.00037)
% of raw gap 81.56% 76.27%
Coefficient effect 0.0011*** 0.0014***
(0.00026) (0.00022)
% of raw gap 18.64% 23.73%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. The actual expenditure share gap is for the full
sample reproduced from Table 1. Approximation error is the difference between the actual expenditure share
gap and the predicted expenditure share gap.
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Table A6: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the Tobit using the urban
variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0044*** 0.0046***
Of which:
lnrexpa 0.0012*** (0.0001) [27.27%] 0.0016*** (0.00036) [34.78%]
fathwage 0.0002*** (0.000031) [4.55%] 0.0004*** (0.00004)     [8.70%]
mothwage 0.00032 *** (0.00032) [7.27%] 0.00048 *** (0.000043)    [10.43%]
edufath 0.0005*** (0.000052) [11.36%] 0.0002*** (0.00004) [4.35%]
edumoth 0.00082*** (0.000047) [18.64%] 0.0004*** (0.000013) [8.70%]
distprimary 0.0009*** (0.000073) [20.45%] 0.0008*** (0.00008) [17.39%]
other  vars 0.00046 [10.45%] 0.00072 [15.65%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other vars comprises the remaining variables. We have not computed the standard
error for these remaining variables.
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Table A7: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the Tobit using the rural
variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0048*** 0.0045***
Of which:
lnrexpa 0.002*** (0.0005) [41.67%] 0.002*** (0.0003)      [44.44%]
fathwage 0.00023*** (0.000061) [4.79%] 0.00017*** (0.000041) [3.78%]
mothwage 0.00038*** (0.000032) [7.92%] 0.00041 *** (0.000037) [9.11%]
edufath 0.00016*** (0.000037) [3.33%] 0.00013*** (0.00001) [2.89%]
edumoth 0.00026 *** (0.000042) [5.42%] 0.0002*** (0.000029) [4.44%]
distprimary 0.0009*** (.000033) [18.75%] 0.0005*** (0.00007) [11.11%]
other  vars 0.00087 [18.13%] 0.00109*** [24.22%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other vars comprises the remaining variables. We have not computed the standard
error for these remaining variables.
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